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Abstract:  In this paper, I examine the effects that changes  in money
growth/inflation  have on inside money and capital accumulation in a general
equilibrium  model.  Money is held to meet a cash-in-advance  constraint and a
reserve  requirement. A change  in the inflation rate will,in  general,  affect  the
ratio of inside money to outside money (the money multiplier).  The data
indicate a small, negative relationship between changes  in the inllation  rate and
the money multiplier.  The model can replicate this stylized observation provided
the computational experiments impose enough complementarity between the cash
good and credit good.  In addition, the model predicts that an anticipated
increase in the inflation  rate causes  agents  to substitute unintermediated capital
fiat money for unintermediated capital (disintermediation).  Disintermediation
occurs over time in the sense  that intermediated capital grows at a slower rate in
the higher inflation  environment.  In this setup, the model is also capable of
replicating  Goldsmith's  observation;  the ratio of intermediaries'  assets  to output
rises  over time.
I benefitted from helpfirl discussions  with Scott Freeman, Greg Hufftnan, Mark Wynne, and
Carlos Zarazaga. Any errors in this paper are solely mine.  The views expressed  in this paper
do not necessarily  represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas nor the Board of
Govemors  of the Federal  Reserve  Svstem.1. Introduction
Beginning  with the work of James  Tobin (1965)  and Miguel Sidrauski  (1967),  researchers
have been interested in the relationship between changes  in money growth/inflation  and the rate
of output growth.  There is ample empirical evidence suggesting  that higher inflation, for
example, results in slower growth.r  Recent versions of the monetary growth models offer
alternative explanations of this sfylized relationship.  The most frequently used model has agents
holding money to satisry a cash-in-advance  constraint.  In models developed by Alan Stockman
(1981) and Jeremy Greenwood and Gregory Hufftnan (1987), leisure is the credit good.  Thus'
an increase in the growth rate of money induces agents  to subsiirute for more leisure and
groMh slows.'?
Another line of research has asked how intermediation  affects the growrh rate.  One
approach focuses  on the 'depth'  of financial structures and is identified  closely with the work of
Rondo Cameron  (1967),  Raymond  Goldmith (1969),  Ronald MacKinnon (1973),  and Edward
Shaw  (1973). In these  studies,  the link between  the size  of the "financial  superstructure"  and
capital purchases  is offered as an explanation for differences in growth rates across  countries.
More recently,  Jeremy  Greenwood  and Boyan  Jovanavic  (1990)  specify  a general  equilibrium
model in which there are economies of scale in information.  Greenwood and Jovanavic
demonstrate how intermediaries can exploit these economies of scale,  leading to faster growth
compared with the autarky equilibrium.  In another approach, the existence  of a financial
intermediary  is sufficient  to induce  faster  growth. Valerie R. Bencivenga  and Bruce D. Smith
I See,  for example,  the evidence  presented  in Milton Friedman (1977),  Roger Kormendi and
Philip  Meguire  (1985),  and  Mark Wynne  (1993)-
'?In addition,  this mechanism  is found in papers  by Thomas  Cooley  and Gary Hansen  (1989)
and Paul Gomme (1993). Larry Jones  and Rodolfo Manuelli (1995)  introduce  a nominal
depreciation  allowance  into the tax code. the implication  is that the return to capital,  and thus,
growth,  are inversely  related  to the inflation rate.(1991) specify a general equilibrium  model in which an intermediary provides liquidity  services
to agents facing idniosynchratic liquidity  shocks. They demonstrate that in a version of the
Diamond-Dybvig  (1983)  model,  growth  will be faster in an equilibrium in which  the intermediary
knows aggregate  liquidity  needs. Bencivenga and Smith show that risk-averse agents will
purchase too little  of the illiquid  capital good compared with an intermediary.  Because  the
intermediary does not face any aggregate  uncertainty, it can allocate more saving into the high-
return capital good and still meet the population's liquidity  needs.
In this paper, I specify a general equilibrium  model in which both output growth and tlrc
quantity of intermediation  are endogenous  responses  tb changes  in anticipated money growth.
Throughout this paper, I use the term changes  in anticipated inllation  as shorthand for
peffnnent,  anticipated changes  in the growth rate of fiat money.  Here, as in several of the
papers cited above, the inflation  rate and output growth are inversely related.  The contribution
of this paper is show  that this model is also  capable  of replicating  two additional  stylized
observations:  the relationship between changes  in anticipated inflation  and changes  in the ratio
of inside money to outside money (the money multiplier)  and Goldsmith's result that the ratio
of intermediaries' assets  to output increases  over time.  In addition, the model specified here
matches  with a commonly  held view; namely,  that higher inflation results  greater
disintermediation.
Several  papers have examined the effect that a change in monetary policy would have on
the money  multiplier. John G. Gurley and Edward S.  Shaw  (1960),  for instance,  argue  that a
one-time,  unanticipated  change  in money  supply  results  in price level  shocks  that are negatively
correlated  with the money  multiplier.  In Gurley and Shaw,  the unanticipated  decline  in themoney stock, for example, results in an increase in the value of nominally denominated assets.'
Because  of these wealth effects, *re demand for deposits rises and the money multiplier
increases. In another experiment, Scott Freeman and Greg Hufftnan (1991) ask how a
permanent change in money growth would affect the money multiplier.  In their setup, money is
a substitute for capital.  Freeman and Hufftrnn,  therefore, have a Tobin effect operating in their
model: an increase in the anticipated money growth permanently lowers the rate of retum on
money, increasing deposits and resulting in a higher money multiplier.
In a related paper, Peter Ireland (1994) offers an alternative view of the effect on
changes  in anticipated inflation  on inside money.  Ireldnd cites empirical evidence suggesting
that the ratio of M2 to Ml  has been increasing over time, a5fting whether a model in which
output grows endogenously  over time could explain this observation.  Ireland uses  a modified
version  of Robert Townsend's  (1983)  model in which agents  are spatially  separated  and
transactions costs of non-cash  purchases. There are two types of exchange  media-privately
issued money (M2)  and government issued money (Ml).  M2 dominates Ml  in rate of return,
but M1 is less  costly  to use  in trade with distant agents. Hence,  there is a well defined  demand
for M1.  With an increase  in the anticipated  inflation rate, a Fisher  effect results  in an increase
in the nominal spread  between  M2 and Ml,  which results  in agents  using  more of M2 money.
Ireland's  model predicts  that the ratio of M2 to Ml,  the intensity  of intermediation  seryices  in
his model,  is positively  related  to changes  in anticipated  inflation.
In this paper, the experiments are similar to those examined in Freeman and Hufftnan
and lreland.  Specifically,  I am interested  in analyzing  the effects  of changes  in the anticipated
rate of inflation, not one-time  changes  in the money  stock. What is different in this paper is
I See  Allan Meltzer (1969)  for an excellent  survey  of the early theoretical  literature  seeking
to explain  the relationship  between  changes  in outside  money  and the money  multiplier.that there is both an intermediation- and consumption-based  demand for money.  Intermediaries
hold frat money to satisfy a reserve requirement, while the consumption-based  demand is a
standard cash-in-advance  constraint.  The implication is that when agents  e4onomize on money
balances in response  to an increase in anticipated inflation  rate, the effect is to reduce
consumption of the cash good and to accumulate deposits at a slower rate.{  With both currency
and required reserves in this model, it is natural to interpret the outside money in this model as
high-powered money.  With both real deposits and the real demand for outside money falling,
the effect of the monetary policy action on the money multiplier  is ambiguous. Anticipated
changes  in the inflation  rate are negatively correlated With the accumulation of deposits and
output growth as the data indicate.  The estimated correlation between the inflation  rate and the
money multiplier  is a usefirl guide for the selection of certain parameter values so that the
model economies can replicate the same relatiorship  as observed in the data.
I run computational experiments to quantify several relationships between the inflation
rate and intermediation  services. In addition to the experiments examining the relationship
between the money multiplier  and inflation, I introduce unintermediated capital into the model.
In doing so, it  is possible to make statements about the relationship between changes  in the
anticipated  inflation rate and disintermediation. Intermediated  capital  is still useful  in this setup
because  there is an intrinsic advantage  to intermediation  services. This advantage  is reflected as
a difference  between  the technologies  transforming  intermediated  or unintermediated  capital
into output. Some  of the computational  experiments,  therefore,  examine  the role that the
changes  in anticipared  inflation have  on disintermediation.
The main findings  in this paper are easily  summarized.  First, I calculate  the impact  that
" Growth is endogenous  in this setup. Following  Sergio  Rebelo  (1991),  I specify  a linear
production  technology. The upshot  is that the model is capable  of replicating  the negative
correlation  between  inflation and output growth identified in the literature.a change in anticipated inflation  has on the money multiplier.  In this model, the effect of a
change in the inllation  rate depends on the relative magnitudes of two elasticities; specifically,
the elasticity of real deposits and the consumption of the cash good with respect to the inflation
rate.  The elasticity of the cash good depends on the substitutability of the cash good for the
credit good.  Postwar data indicate a small, negative correlation between the inllation  rete and
the Ml  money multiplier,  but no statistically significant relationship between inflation  and the
M2 money multiplier.  The model predicts a small, negative relationship between adicipated
inflation  and the money multiplier  for parameter settings in which cash and credit colrsumption
goods are "moderately close" gross complements. If thb two consumption goods are gross
substitutes,  the model predicts that the inflation  rate is positively associated  with the money
multiplier.
Second,  a widely held belief is that increases  in the inflation  rate result in financiar
disintermediation. Often, the existence  of interest-rate  (Regulation  Q) ceilings  is the proposed
explanation for this relationship.  Another  finding presented in this paper is that
disintermediation occurs in a general equilibrium  model, even though no interest-rate ceilings
are present. On the bank's  liability side,  agents  deposit  fewer  goods  when  the inflation rate
increases  which  is one commonly  characterization  of disintermediation. On the household's
asset  side,  the bank becomes  smaller  in the sense  that intermediated  capital  shrinks  relative  to
total capital: disintermediation agents substitute unintermediated capital for intermediated
capital.s  In addition to "immediate"  disintermediation,  a sustained  increase  in the inflation rate
results  in intermediated  capital  accumulating  at a slower  rate,  so that disintermeidation  also
'In  a related  paper,  John H. Boyd and Mark Gertler (1994)  investigate  the claim that the
U.S.  banking  industry  is declining. One measure  that Boyd and Gertler use is the ratio of bank
loans  to nominal GDP.  These  authors  are trying to correctly  measure  whether  there is a trend
toward less  intermediation. Here, the emphasis  is whether  intermediated  capital responds
negatively  to changes  in the inflation rate.occurs over time as measured by the gap between what intermediated capital would have been s
periods ahead under a lower inflation  rate and what intermediated capital is s periods from now
for this inflation  rate.  Computational experiments also show that the model can replicate
Goldsmith's finding that the intermediaries' asset rise relative to output over time in growing
economies.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 lays out the basic model.  I calibrate the
model in Section 3.  In addition, I run computational experiments to examine the inflation-rate
effects on consumption of the cash good versus  the credit good and on the money multiplier.
Unintermediated  capital is introduced in Section 4.  I lun  computational experiments to look at
the effects of higher inflation  on the ratio of intermediated-to-unintermediated  capital.  I also
calculate the total capital stock over a loGperiod  horizon and different  inflation  rates for the
economies.
2. The Model
The model economy  consists  of four types  of agents:  firms, households,  banks,  and a
monetary  authority. In each  period, firms operate  in a perfectly  competitive  market,  producing
three different goods--a  'credit' consumption  good (c), a 'cash-in-advance'  consumption  good
(cg),  and a capital  good  (k).  Purchases  of the capital good this period, or investment,  are
denoted  \.  Firms seek  to maximize  period-t profits, represented  by the following  expression:
(1)
prl  = p.,,c,tpr,cg,*  pr,x,  -  p",t,k,
where pf  denotes  the firm's profit.  Profits are maximized  subject  to c, + cg,  + x,  < f(\).  I use
pr to denote  the price of the credit consumption  good,  p, is the price of the cash  good,  and p, is
the price of the investment  good with each  measured  in units of fiat money. Here, r is therental price of capital.  Here, f($  represents  a common-knowledge  technology that is
homogeneous  of degree one in the capital stock.6 The law of motion for the capital stock is lq*r
:  (l-S)lq *  x.,  where  6 is the depreciation  rate. The period-0  stock  of capital is assumed  to be
given.
Note that the credit, cash,  and investment goods are perfect substitutes in production.
Throughout this analysis  I assume  that strictly positive quantities of the credit, cash,  and
investment goods are produced.  By the first-order conditions, all goods will sell at the same
period+ price; that is, p, :  Pz  :  Pr = p.  In addition,  profit-maximizing  behavior  implies  that
the marginal  product of capital,  f0,  equals  the real reital paid to capital'
Banks in this model also operate in a perfectly competitive environment.  Fonnally'  the
period-t profit maximization  condition is:
Pr! =  P,lr,+7-6'!k,  + res,  - P,7d,,
where prb is bank profits, res is the amount of reserve balances  carried by the banks, d. denotes
the quantity of goods  deposited  last  period and carried  over to period t,  and q is the real return
offered on deposits. The initial stock  of reserves,  reso,  is given. The bank's  period-t profit is
maximized  subject  to lq + (es./p,  < 4 (the balance-sheet  equation)  and res,  2 yr-rpt.rd'  (the
reserve  requirement). The zero-profit  condition implies  that the real return offered on deposits,
q,,  equals  (l-Tt-r)[rt  +  1-6]  + yr,r  pt-r/p,. In addition,  I assume  that p,-rlpr  < r, + 1-5  so that
reserves  are rate of return dominated. Rate-of-return  dominance  implies  that banks  hold
reserves  up to the amount required;  that is, resr  :  7,-rP.rd,.
6  Following  Rebelo  (1991),  the capital  good is interpreted  as  a combination  of both physical
and  human  caDital.
(2)The representative household maximizes the present discounted value of utility  subject to
a sequence  of budget constraints and to a cash-in-advance  constraint on the purchases  of the
cash  good. The household's  problem is
tPu
V U(cg,,  c)  s.t.
subject  to
(a)  P,  (c,  f  dftr +  curr'*r)
<PAd +T'
O)  pr  cgt  < curri,
where T is a lump-sum cash injection from the monetary authority.  The initial  stock of
currency,  curro,  is given.
constraint  (a) is the law of motion for bank deposits. Goods deposited and carried over
to next  period (t+1)  equal  the gross  return on period+ deposits  plus  the cash  transfer  from
government, less  purchases  of the credit good and currency.  constlaint  (b) is the cash-in-
advance  constraint.  As is typical in models in which a cash-in-advance  is present, I assume  that
deposit returns cannot be used immediately to purchase  the cash good.  one  interpretation  is
that deposit returns are paid after lhe matket for the cash  good meets. This restriction
generates  a well-defined demand for currency.  Together, the reserve requirement and the cash-
in-advance  constraint  generate  a well-defined  demand  for money,  making  the existence  of a
monetary  equilibrium  possible.  but not guaranteeing  it.
The monetary  authority prints money  and distributes  it in a lump-sum  fashion  to
households.  Formally,  T, :  N(tt\  - n\-,)'  For simplicity,  I assume  that the population  is
rnax  X
t=oconstant and normalize N  =  1. Thus, per capita transfers are identical to aggregate  transfers.
In addition, the monetary authority chooses  the reserve requirement ratio.  The monetary
authority can comrnit to a sequence  of money stocks and reserve requirements.  Specifically' let
money evolve according to the following rule:
(3) 
M, = Q,M,-,
An equilibrium in this model economy  is a sequence  of prices  {p,,t,,q,},  a real allocation
{c,,cg,,x,,\},stocls  of financial  assets  {curr,,res,,d,},  and monetary  policy variables,  {1, 0,} such
that
(i)  Given prices, money growth, and reserve requirement ratios, the real allocation
and stocks  of financial  assets  solve  the household's  maximization  problem [P1];
(iD  Given prices,  money  growth,  and reserve  requirement  ratios,  the allocations  solve
the firm's period-t maximization  problem;
(iiD  Given prices,  money  growth,  and reserve  requirement  ratios,  the allocations
solve  the bank's  period-t maximization  problem;
(iv)  trt* = currt +  rest V t>0






Pfgt  = currt
td1
lim-  I  'l=0
,Jo  I r_r  I 'r&-
I assume  throughout this analysis  that fit+r  qt+r )  0; that is, the nominal rate of interest is
strictly positive. Accordingly,  the cash-in-advance  constraint  is binding.
Consider  a special  case  for the household's  momentary  utility function. Specifically'
suppose  that
U(.) = (1  -o)  -' 
[(cg,-r+16  g-r; -ta1t-".
Further, let
f(k)  =  Ak,.
From these  special  functional  forms,  the first-order  condition  relating the marginal  rate of
substitution  for the consumption  goods  takes  on the following  fofins:
(8) 
c  l- ,  _ 1rrrR,_,),.^
,ol
l0Equation  (8) follows  from equation  (4), where  &*r  :  fi*r (l-y)(A+  16)  *  1/n,*'1,  and from the
firm's and the bank's  first-order conditions  for profit maximization. In addition,  the growth rate
of the model economy is given by
(9)  p=pt(1-y)(A+l-6) +y./rTt*rlr/"
and,  with rq :  res,  + culrt
[from equation (5)]
(10) 0 = np  From equatiorB (3) and (6) and the reserve requirement constraintl.
I assume  that the monetary authority  chooses  a fixed growth rate of the money supply and a
fixed reserve requirunent  ratio so that 0, -  0 and 1  :  y.
Equation (9) characterizes the balanced-growth'  path for the agent's decision variables.
By the household's first-order  conditions, consumption of both the credit good and the cash
good,  as  well as  deposits,  grow at the rate p,. Similarly,  the growth  rate for deposits,  capital,  and
output also grow at the same rate.
An interesting feature of this model economy is that the growth rate, p, is a function of
the two policy variables,  € and y. Together,  equations  (9) and (10) indicate  that faster  money
growth results in higher inflation  and a lower growth rate.  This finding holds because  the
inflation  rate lowers the value of reserve holdings, thus, lowering the return that be offered on
deposits. Households  elect,  therefore,  to accumulate  fewer  deposits  because  of the low return
offered when  inflation is high.? Similarly,  an increase  in reserve  requirements  also  lowers  the
return offered  by banks,  forcing  banks  to hold a larger fraction of assets  in the relatively  low-
yielding  reserves.
Another implication of the relationship  between  the return on deposits  and the inflation
rate is the effect  on the consumption  of credit good  relative  to cash  good. In equation  (8),
t The finding that inflation and output growth  are inversely  related  in an endogenous  growth
model with a reserve  requirement  is alluded  to Jones  and Manuelli. In another  paper,  Haslag
(1994)  quantifies  the inflation rate-output  growth  relationship  for different parameter  settings.
11changes  in the inflation  rate affect the marginal rate of substitution between the credit good and
the cash good.  Indeed, with these specific functional forms, the nominal interest rate is an
increasing  function of the anticipated  inflation rate.8 Thus,  with L 2 -1,  equation  (8) indicates
that the ratio of the credit good to the cash good is positively related to changes  in the inflation
rate.  The intuition  is straightforward.  As the inflation  rate rises, the cash good is more heavily
taxed in the sense  that the currency held by the agent diminishes in value more quickly.  The
rate at which the agent is willing to substitute the credit good for the cash good depends on
whether  the goods  are gross  substitutes  (-l  < l,<  0) or gross  complements  (?"  > 0).  Indeed'
limr--  c/cg :  E, where E is some constant, representin!  the fixed proportion  in which the credit
and cash goods are consumed. In short, this limiting  condition 
. 
implies that the two consumption
goods are perfect complements and are consumed in fixed proportions.
3. Numerical Simulatioru  I: Consumption allotations
In this section, I quantifu the effects that changes  in the inflation  rate have on two
separate  issues.  First, how do changes  in the inflation rate affect the consumption  of the cash
good relative to the credit good?  In addition, I compare the inflation-rate  sensitivity of the
consumption allocations under different values of ?". Second,  I investigate the effects that
changes  in the inflation rate have  on inside  versus  outside  money. The money  multiplier is
examined  to judge the model economy's  prediction compared  with correlations  present  in post-
war U.S. data. These  computational  experiments  are linked because  the assumptions  regarding
the substitutability  of the credit and cash  gocds-the value  of l" selected-bears  on the sign  of the
money  multiplier response  to different values  of the inflation rate
I Formally,  dR/6n :  [(1-y)(A+  1-6)] > 0.
t')3.  I Calibratine the model
The time period for the model is one year.  Accordingly, the model's parameters are set
as follows. I assume  that the growth  rate of technology  is2%.  I set  o :  2.  So,  with 1 :0  and
n:1.0,r  = FIA+1-6lt/":1.02.  With  6:0.10and F:0.9733,then  A =0.169.
The next step is to identiry the value of ().  In a nonmonetary version of the model co  is
the relative expenditure share. If  one had the time series,  o  should be measured as the
proportion  of totel consumption (probably measured as consumption on nondurables and
sewices) in which credit (measured as anything other than currency) was used to conduct the
transaction.  Here, the approach is to take the results  'obtained 
'f.o. 
th.  Federal Reserve's
survey  on transactions.  Commissioned  in 1984,  the survey  results  show  that roughly  30% of
transactions  are made  using  cash.e  The rate of consumer  price inflation was  4.3 percent  in 1984.
Another suwey was commissioned in 1986  in which the proportion  of transactions made with
currency was nearly identical and the inflation  rate fell to 1.9 percent.  Two observations do not
make for a robust calculation of the mean.  In light of the paucity of the data, I use 30 percent
as  the proportion of consumption  purchased  with currency. Hence,  cg :0.3(c+cg)and  c =
0.7(c+cg),  irnplying  that c/cg = 2.333. The average  inflation rate over the postwar  period
(1948-93)  is 4.2  percent. I also  need  the average  value  of the reserve  requirement  ratio.  The
average  ratio of required reserves  to total bank deposits  is 0.036  for the period 1959-92.  I use  y
:  0.036  in the computational  experiments.ro  Thus,  equation  (8) sets  2.333  :
e  These  results  a(e also  reported in Cooley  and Hansen  (1991).
!0  Bank deposits  include  demand  deposits,  other checkable  deposits,  and savings  accounts.
These  items  are the types  of accounts  against  which  reserves  must be held for most of th€
sample  period. One might argue  that this is an upper bound  for the interpretation  of
intermediated  capital. Alternatively,  one could apply  the ratio of required reserves  to the sum
of total deposits  plus funds  held in mutual funds. Another issue  is that I am using  the average
reserve  reouirement  ratio  as  a marsinal  ratio.
| --)[or(1.042)(1.0659)]r/r*r.  I consider  two alternative  values  of 1",  one in which  the cash  good  and the
credit good are substitutes and another in which these two consumption goods are complements.
For L = -0.5  (1.0)  the cash  and credit goods  are gross  substitutes  (complements),  so that o  =
1.J642  (4.897\.tl
3.  2 Consumntion  allocations
The first experiment i8 to determine what the model predicts regarding the ratio of the
credit good to the cash good under various rates of inflation.  Figure 1 plots the percentage of
total consumption allocated to the cash good at variouB rates oi inflation  for two different values
of 1,. Note that when the goods are gross substitutes (1, :  -O.5),  a high inflation  rate means a
moderate  shift toward  the credit consumption  good. With n :  2.0 (corresponding  to a 100%
inflation rate), the cash  good represents  only about 11%  of 1'3,ta,l  consumption,  compared  with
the 3O%  spent  on the cash  good at a 4  % inflation rate. In contrast,  if the goods  are gross
complements  (1,  :  1.0),  there is a much smaller  change  in the ratio of the cash  good  to total
consumption. In effect,  the tax on the cash  good is then "shared"  by the credit good in the sense
that the household wants to consume less of the complementary good when the cash good is
taxed. In Figure 1,  with 100%  inflation, M.Vo  of total consumption  is spent  on the cash  good  as
compared  with 30 percent  of total consumption  when  the inflation rate is 4%. What the plot
tells  us is not too surprising;  for a given  change  in the inllation rate,  the consumption  of the
cash  good  is related  to what the researcher  assumes  about  the substitutability  of the cash  good
for the credit good.
What are the welfare  costs  of the higher inflation? With two separate  motives  for
" As King and Rebelo  note, a necessary  and sufficient  condition for finite utility is (0p)''  <
1. This condition is satisfied  in each  of the experiments  run in this paper.
t4holding  money,  the household's  decisions  are distorted along  two dimensiors:  the allocation
between the cash good and credit good and the allocaiion between consumption today and
saving affected by a change in the real return on deposits. Welfare costs are calculated as a
percentage change in consumption that is necessary  for the household to be satisfied as in a
economy in which the inflation  rate is set equal to zero.  Formally, U(cgt,,ci  ):,)  =
U({cg',,qx1+$)l=,), where  the superscript  0 denotes  a coruumption  path for a policy setting
(n=1.0)  and the superscript 1 denotes a consumption path for the alternative policy setting.
Table 1 reports the value of {  for three different  inflation  rates.  For each inflation  rate settinS,
I consider the case in which the two consumption goods are substitute.s  (?,"=-0.5)  and
c4mplements  (1,-1.0).  Table I shows  that the welfare  losses  are greater  than 5 percent  of
consumption for even moderate inflations when the cash goods and credit goods are substitutes.
Table 1 also shows  that welfare losses  are smaller for the case in which the two consumption
goods are gross complements as compared with the case in which the two goods are gross
substitutes. The decline in the welfare losses  associated  with increases  in the value of l, should
not be too surprising since the inflation  distortion  declines as the consumption of the goods
moves toward a fixed proportion.  In contrast to model in which the cash-in-advance  constraint
is the sole reason  for holding  money,  welfare  losses  approach  a positive  lower bound  even  when
the cash  and credit goods  are perfect  complements.  As Jones  and Manuelli find, in a simple
cash-in-advance  model,  assuming  that the cash  and credit goods  are perfect complements
effectively  eliminates  ahe  distortion between  the cash  and credit goods  so that the welfare  losses
approach  zero as  the two consumption  goods  approach  perfect complmentarity.
3.3  Mone! multiplier
The second experiment quantifies the effect that a change in the inflation  rate has on the
t5money multiplier.  I define the money multiplier  as the ratio of nominal deposits to fiat money;
that is, ffr\  :  p,4/q.  With deposits  increasing  at the rate p :  (Br)'i'. it follows immediately
from the money market equilibrium  condition (equation 10) that mr\/mn\-r  = ;  =  1, or the
growth rate of the money multiplier  is zero.  The question is how the level of the money
multiplier  responds to differences in anticipated rates of inflation.
As noted above, Freeman and Hufftnan examined the effect of a change in anticipated
inflation  on the money multiplier.  Freeman and Hufftnan emphasize  the role of money as a
substitute asset for capital in their model.  As noted above, changes  in anticipated inflation
affect  the money  multiplier in their paper though the'Tobin effect;  the money  mulriplier is
positively related to changes  in the anticipated inflation  rate because  agents substitute deposits
(intermediated capital) for money.  One way to distinguish this model from Freeman and
Hufftnan model is with regards to why agents  hold money.l2 In the model specified here,
money's  serves  two roles,  it is necessary  for exchange  purposes  and to satisfy  legal  restrictions
necessary  to acquire capital through an intermediary.  Here, when higher anticipated inflation
causes  people to economize on their money balances,  consumption and deposit accumulation are
both affected  in the same  direction. Hence,  economizing  on money  balances  in the Freeman-
Hufftnan model results in greater capital holding.  Based on the different motives for holding
money,  the question  is how the results  derived  from the alternative  view  proposed  in this paper
differ  from those found in Freeman and Huffrnan.
To formally examine the effect that a change  in the anticipated inflation  rate will have
on the money  multiplier, I rewrite the money  market equilibrium condition as r\  :  prc&  + ydt.
This expression  substitutes  the cash-in-advance  constraint  for currency  and the binding reserve
12  Another important distinction  is the empirical  observation  explained  by these  two papers.
Freeman  and Huffman were attempting  to explain  the inside  money-output  relationship  at
business  cycle  frequencies,  whereas  here the time frame is for lorv-frequency  data.




The issue then is to determine how changes  in the anticipated inflation  rate affect deposits
relative to the sum of reserves  plus consumption of the cash good.  After  differentiating, the
expression  for the money multiplier's  tesponse  to a change in anticipated inflation  is:
rdmml  r sgn\ 
dn  l=  sSnl -  arglanl ----;=-  | L5
oalofi
where the first term inside the brackets is the elasticity of deposits with respect to the inflation
rate and the second term is the elasticity of the cash good with lespect to the inflation  late.
Both deposits and the consumption of the cash good are inversely related to changes  in the
inflation rate so that the bracketed  expression  is qualitatively  ambiguous.  Clearly,  the
researcher's  assumptions  affects the outcome in the sense  that whether the cash and credit
goods as gross  substitutes determines the change  in the marginal rate of substitution between
the cash  good  and the credit. Provided  that the demand  for cash  goods  is a continuous  function
in the inflation  rate and I,  there exists a value of l, for which the sum of the elasticities will
equal  zero.
I solve  for the value  of the money  multiplier, using  the binding reserve  requirement
constraint  and the aggregate  consistency  condition,  Y.  :  c, *  cg, + xi. Figure 2 plots the values
of the money  multiplier for different inflation rates  and for different values  of I.  The numerical
experiments  indicate  a relatively  large  positive  association  exists  between  the inflation rate and
t7the money  multiplier when  the cash  good  and credit goods  are gross  substitute  goods. If'
however,  the two goods  are gross  complements,  the relationship  between  the money  multiplier
and the inflation  rate could be positive or negative.  For the case in which the two goods are
,'close"  complements  (?, :3.0),the  value  of the money  multiplier declines  over the entire range
of the inflation  rate considered. There is simply not enough change in the consumption of the
cash good to offset the decline in deposits for a given change in the inflation  rate.  For the case
in which the two goods  are "moderate"  complements  (X= 1.0),  the value  of the money  multiplier
declines  as  the inllation rate increases  lrrom  0% to 6%.  For inflation rates above  67o,  Figure 2
shows  that the value of the money multiplier  increases.  as the inflation  rate rises.
What do we observe in the data?  Table 2 reports the results from a linear regression  of
the money  multiplier and the inflation rate.l3 As Table 2 shows,  the money  measure  chosen
affects the regression results. There is a small negative association between the Ml  money
multiplier  and the inflation  rate, but there is no significant relationship between the M2 money
multiplier  and the inflation  rate.
The empirical  evidence  offers some  guidelines  for setting  the model's  parameters. To
replicate the correlations found in the data, the model economies studied must specify that the
cash  and credit consumption  goods  are at least  moderate  complements.  Note that for cases  in
which l,  < 1.0,  the association  between  the anticipated  inflation rate and the money  multiplier is
positive. What this implies  for the model is that L must in the 1.0-1.5range  in order to replicate
the negative  association  observed  in the u.S. data. For l" in the 0.9to  1.0  range,  one would  get
be able  to match  the statistically  insignificant  association  observed  between  the M2 money
', The money  multiplier is the fatio of Ml  or M2 to high-powered  money. The inflation rate
is calculated  aS  the December-to-December  changes  in the consumer  price index. Each  of the
money  multiplier regressions  include  one lagged  value  of the money  multiplier.  The reason  for
including  this lagged  value  is account  for the unit root present  in each  multiplier.
18multiplier.  At very low rates of inflation, the money multiplier  is negatively related to the
inflation rate, and is slightly  positive  for moderate  inflation rates  between  5% and 10%. Since
the postwar  U.S. inflation rate experience  generally  lies in the O%  to l07o range,  the values  of I'
near, but slightly below one seem capable of yielding sufFrciently  mixed results so that the
statistical relation is not significantly different from zero.
4. Numerical Simulations II:  Disintennediation
In this section, I focus on the effect that changes  in anticipated inllation  have on the
intermediated  capital. Specifically,  I introduce  a second  type of capital,  one which does  not
require an intermediary.  Here, unintermediated capital has a declining marginal product, which
results in all capital eventually being intermediated as a limiting  condition.  This also means that
presence  of unintermediated capital with declining marginal product does not materially affect
the results obtained in the simple model represented in the previous section.
Introducing this type of capital does permit one to study the effects of changes  in the
inflation rate on disintermediation. I am thinking of disintermediation  as  the household's  act of
substituting  direct capital  purchases  for bank deposits. In this setup,  the fraction of
intermediated  capital  is an endogenous  decision. Indeed,  if capital  stocks  are too low, banks  will
operate. If a banking  industry  exists,  the limiting condition is that all capital  will eventually  be
financed  through an intermediary.
A change  in the anticipated  inflation rate has  two effects  on the intermediation  process.
First, the immediate  effect  of the higher inflation results  is that households  substitute
unintermediated  capital for intermediated  capital. Second,  over time, pernanently higher
inflation causes  households  to accumulate  intermediated  capital  at a slower  rate.
The second  type of capital is unintermediated  in the sense  that households  can  directly
lolend the funds to the firm.  Hence, the gross real return (dividend payment) is paid directly to
households,  bypassing  the bank and the reserve  requirement. Firms purchase  unintermediated
capital,  which  produces  ouput according  to the following  technology
(11)
B(k ")
Substituting  this in the representative  firm's profit functions,  one gets
(12)
prr  =  pflk) +pB(k  \  - r(k +k)
With  the assumption that the two types of capital are perfect iriput substirutes,  the profit
maximizing  firm will choose  the composition  of capital such  that
(13)
ft(k)  = aB(k ")-l
where  equation  (13) is a simple  arbitrage  condition. Households  will purchase  unintermediated
until the marginal  products  of each  type of capital are equal. Consider  the special  case  in which
f(k)  :  Ak.  As in the case  in which only intermediated  capital  exists,  the return offered on
deposits,  q = (A+1-6).  Utility maximizing  agents,  therefore,  will buy unintermediated  capital
until its return is equal  to the return offered by deposits. In short,  q:  t(1-yXA+  1-6) + yk1  =
lcrBf(k"X-L  + 1-61.
The total capital  stock  may respond  very  differently to changes  in the anticipated
inflation rate,  especially  as  compared  with to the case  in which  all capital  is inrermediated.
Consider,  for example,  the case  in which  the anticipated  inflation rate rises. As discussed  above,
the real return on intermediated  capital  declines  and the stock  of capital  would fall. With
unintermediated  capital,  the decline  in the real return on intermediated  capital  induces
20households  to purchase more capital directly.  Depending on the elasticity of substitution
between unintermediated and intermediated capital, it is possible that the total capital stock
rises in response  to an increase in the anticipated inflation  rate.
Over time, only intermediated capital will be accumulated. Indeed, as t --) oo,  all capital
will be intermediated.  With  a linear production technology, the marginal product of capital is
not dependent on the quantity of intermediated capital.  This setup is rationalized as an
inherent advantage  to intermediated capital.  One can think of the difference as a being a
product of different  costs associated  with intermediated and unintermediated capital.  For
example, suppose  the same technology transforms both intermediated and unintermediated
capital into units of output.  Suppose  that the costs of monitodng  intermediated capital are
constant, but the costs of monitoring unintermediated capital aie an increasing function of the
quantity of unintermediated capital.  This setup could yield a model in which net output from
unintermediated capital is a diminishing function of its quantity.  If the monitoring costs of
intermediated are, for example, zero, then the gross  production technology for intermediated
capital is also the net output technology.  In this sense,  intermediation has an advantage  over
unintermediated  capital. The limiting condition  identified above  would follow.to
The arbitrage condition implies that k'  is a function of the other parnmeters in the
model; namely,  the reserve  requirement,  the exponent  on the Cobb-Douglas  production
technology  (cr),  the technology  constant  (B), and the marginal  product of intermediated  capital
'o  There are several  modifications  which  would eliminate  this limiting condition. I could
assume  that there is an externality  associated  with unintermediated  capital. A spillover  from
unintermediated  keeps  it valued  even  in the limit.  Alternatively,  I could introduce  exogenous
growth into the technology  parameter,  B.  With careful  selection  of the parameters,  it is possible
that the ratio of intermediated  to unintermediated  capital would  be constant  over time. While
permitting would eliminate the model being  rigged  toward i0O% intermediation  in the limit, this
feature would not change  the results  presented  in this paper. The balanced  growth  path would
extend  to unintermediated  capital increasing  at rate p.
2l(A+ 1-6). Rewriting the arbihage
(14)
condition, one obtains
,, =  ts-(l-s)l+ ^tcrBj
I assume  that the initial  stock of total capital--ku *  k-equals  l.  For the computational exercises,
the choice of a and B pin down the ratio of unintermediated capital to total capital in the first
period. For the models  reported here,  I choose  cr = 0.35  and B :  0.35  as  the settings  largely
because  these values are typical in the business  cycle literature.  Numerical solutions indicate
that with lower values  of a, the ratio of unintermediated  to total capital  decline. Equation (14)
indicates that as the value of B declines, the ratio of unintermediated capital to total capital also
declines. Qualitatively, the results of the experiments are unchanged if one considers altemative
values of cr and B.
Figure 3 examines  the effects that changes  in the inflation  rate have on the ratio of
unintermediated capital to total capital.  Intuitively,  as the inflation  rate rises, the return offered
by deposits  falls. By (14), the quantity  of unintermediated  capital  rises. A lower retum on
deposits induces households to buy more capital directly until the last unit returns the same as
intermediated  capital  offers. As Figure 3 shows,  for the baseline  parameter  settings,  an increase
in fi from 1.01  to 2.0 results  in unintermediated  capital  rising  from slightly  more thtn &7o of
total capital  to roughly  77%. Bq,avse  the parameter  values  for B and s were chosen  somewhat
arbitrarily, Figure 3 is not intended  to serve  as a measure  of the size  of the inflation-rate  effect.
Rather,  the figure is a graphical  display  of the effect  that disintermediation  has  due to an
increase  in the anticipated  rate of inflation. This finding is consistent  with the conventional
wisdom;  changes  in the anticipated  inflation rate do affect  the size  of intermediated  capital
relative  to total capital. What is somewhat  noteworthy  is that such  disintermediation  occurs  in a
22model without interest rate ceilings.  Instead, reserve requirements are sufficient to yield this
result.
How do changes  in the anticipated rate of inflation  affect capital accumulation over
time? In this.setup,  the ratio.  of k" to k" + k will fall as  the quantity of intermediated  capital
grows endogenously  over time.  In anther computational experiment, I look at how the total
capital stock evolves  for different  values of the inllation  rate.  Specifically, I run the model for
100  periods.  I narrow the range of inflation  rates since there is simply no historical experience
in which the inflation  rate has been at 100% for  100  consecutive  years. So, I look at inflation
i
rates  between  0 and 10%.
Figure 4 plots the total capital stock (k'  + k) - inflation  rate combination at date m,
where  m :  1,2, ...,100. The height of the surface  at each  date measures  the total capital stock.
As moves along the inllation  rate axis for a given data, the differences in the total capital stock
measure the effect that a change in the inflation  rate has on total capital accumulated by that
date.  At  t :  100,  for example, the surface measures  the date-100 capital stocks at inflation  rates
between  0% and 10%. The upward slope  in the surface  as one moves  from 1.1  to I on the
inflation  rate axis indicates that a larger amount of capital stock is accumulated in the low-
inflation economies  than in the high-inflation  economies.  In the model economy,  the date-l
stock  of intermediated  capital  appears  negligibly  different for l0% inflation rates  than for 0%
inflation rates. Figure 4, however,  suggests  that the rate of intermediated  capital  accumulation
appears  more substantial.  After 100  periods,  the total capital  stock  is about 15%  higher in the
model economy  with 0% percent  inflation as  compared  with the model economy  with l0Vo
inflation. After periods  as short as fifty years,  the capital  stock  in the 0% inflation-rate  case  is
5.8%  higher  than the stock  in the 10%  inflation-rate  case. Thus, Figure  4 shows  that even
moderate  sustained  inflation can diminish capital  accumulation  quite dramatically  whenmeasured  over time.
Thus far, this analysis  has neglected the effects that different  reserve requirements have
on the economies.  It is straightforward  to show  that for a given  increase  in the inflation rate,
the gross  return on.deposits  falls  by a larger  amount when  the reserve  requirement  ratio is
greater.rt By equation  (9), the rate of growth  in the model economy  is, therefore,  more
sensitive to changes  in the inflation rate when the reserve requirement is greater.  To illustrate
the effects of higher reserve requirements, Table 3 reports the value of the period-lOo capital
stocks for several different reserve requirement ratios.  As with the simulations in Figure 4, the
inflation rates are  0% tnd l0% for the purposes  of these  compirisons. One can immediately
see the effect that a higher reserve requirement ratio has on capital accumulation by looking
down a column in Table 3. The decline  in date-100  capital stocks  is indicative  of the effect  that
a change in reserve requirements has on the growth rate of the economies. Except for the last
row of Table 3, one sees  that the percentagedifference between the capital stocks gets larger as
the reserve  requirement  ratio increases.  At the 3.6%  reserve  requirement,  the capital  stock  is
abo|t 15% larger  for the case  in which the inflation is 0% as compared  with the case  in which
the inflation rate is 10%. Yet, for a 2O%  resewe  requirement,  the percentage  change  in the
capital stock  is about 59% larger in the 0% inflation-rate  environment  than in the 10% inflation-
rate environment. The last row in Table 3 is indicative  of disintermediation  resulting  from hiSh
reserve  requirements.  With a 50% reserve  requirement  the total capital  stock  is only 3% higher
in the O%  inflation-rate  economy. Indeed,  the total capital  stock is equal  to one in the high-
inflation-rate  economy,  the same  as  the initial capital stock. In this experiment,  all capital  is
unintermediated. In the 0% inflation rate case,  a small  quantity of capital  is intermediated,  and
'' This can  be seen  by differentiating  the gross  real return on deposits  with respect  to y and
taking the partial derivative  of the resulting  expression  with respect  to n.  In shott,  6rl0y0n = -
th'!  < 0.
24grows  so slowly  that after 100  periods  the total capital  stock  has increased  by only 3%. Some
countries have used high reserve requirement ratios to stabilize financial markets.  Table 3
results suggest  some of the potential detrimental effects associated  with high reserve
requirements in terms of lowering capital accumulation and development of intermediaries.'6
The final question addressed  in this paper is whether the model is capable of replicating
Goldsmith's  finding. In his book, Goldsmith  presents  evidence  indicating  that the ratio of
aggregate  bank assets  to output rises over time.  This finding uses  data from  1863-1960  and is
offered for over 20 countries.  Thus, the question is whether the model matches this rather
robust stylized fact.  Figure 5 plots the ratio of intermeSiated capital, the bank's largest asset,  to
output for three different values  of the inflation rate; namely,  O%,l0%,allrd'  5O%- As Figure 5
shows,  the ratio of intermediated capital to output does increasb over time, though at a bit
slower rate for higher inllation  rates.  This result is largely due to fact that the technology
parameter, A, is less than one.  With  A  < 1, output is smaller than the capital stock.  Though
both quantities grow at the same rate along the balanced growth path, the change in
intermediated  capital is relatively  larger so that ldy increases  over time.  As such,  the model is
capable  of replicating  Goldsmith's  result.
5. Discussion
ln this paper,  a general  equilibrium model is specified  in which  I examine  the effects  that
movements  in the inflation rate have  on various  aspects  of financial  intermediation. The model
is one in which  growth is endogenous.  There is a well-defined  demand  for currency  via a cash-
in-advance  constraint  and a well-defined  demand  for reserves  via a reserve  requirement. Money
'6  Argentina,  for example,  has a marginal  reserve  requirement  ratio of 50% on demand
depositsthen has both an exchange  motive and a legal restrictions motive.  The fiat money in this
monetary growth model is naturally interpretable as high-powered money.
In this setup, inflation  retards the intermediation process. An  increase in the anticipated
rate of inflation  results in deposits being accumulated at a slower pace because  the presence  of a
reserve requirement; the return on intermediated capital/deposits being is inversely related to
the inflation  rate.
I conduct more specific experiment using the model.  First, I examine the effect that
changes  in anticipated inflation  have on the money multiplier.  The purpose is to determine
what parameter settings will permit the model to replicate low-frequency correlations between
inflation  and the money multiplier.  The data indicate that the inflation  rate is inversely related
to the Ml  money  multiplier, but that no significant  relationship'  holds  between  the M2 money
multiplier  and inflation.  Because  the demand for currency is also inversely related to inflation,
the money multiplier  may either rise or fall in response  to a higher inflation  rate'  Numerical
analyses  show that the cash good and the credit good must be close enough complements  for the
model to replicate the weak negative correlation between the money multiplier  and inflation.  In
this setup,  the response  by the money  multiplier precedes  to a samedirection  response  in output
by one period. Hence,  the model is capable  of matching  the positive  correlation  between  the
money  multiplier and future output found in Robert G. King and Charles  L Plosser  (1983).
Instead  of real financial  innovations,  the model accounts  for this correlation  as the result  of
endogenous  responses  in both output and the money  multiplier to changes  in the anticipated
inflation rate.
In the second  part of the paper,  the emphasis  is on capital accumulation  and the
intermediation  process. I introduce  a second  type of capital  that does  not require
intermediation  services.  Thus, intermediated  capital  only exists  when  capital  demand  are large
26enough.  In this model, higher anticipated inflation  results in disintermediation; agents shift
from intermediated to unintermediated capital.  Thus, the model explains the bouts of
disintermediation  as features of a model with reserve requirements.  In general, the model also
explains how a combination of inflation  and reserve requirements can retard the growth of
intermediated capital over time.  Finally, the model economy is capable of replicating
Goldsmith's  empirical result  that the ratio of deposits  to income  rises.
In general, the model shows  that the existence of reserve requirements results in
anticipated movements in money growth/inflation  being a source of shocks  to the economy at
relatively low frequencies. In the paper, I focus on correlations  ' between inflation  and fairly
broad measures  of an intermediary's  liability and asset  structure. The model is a simple  one.
As such, one would like to ask additional questions with a mord detailed model specification.
One issue is that this model is not capable of generating interesting transition dynamics. It
would be interesting to study the impact that movements in the anticipated inflation  rate would
have on the model economy as it moves from one steady state to another.  Another  issue is the
composition  of the intermediary's  liabilities. One of the more interesting  developments  in
banking  has  been  the creation  of new liabilities  to circumvent  reserve  requirements. In this
setup,  one could treat this as simply  a lowering  of reserve  requirements,  but a fuller treatment
would examine  compositional  issues.  One could perhaps  solve  for the rate of financial
innovation  as a function of preferences,  technologies,  and policies.
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29Table I
Welfare Costs  of Inflation
it  1.  l0  1.25  1.50
1"  :  4.s  0.068  0.174  0.351
l. = 1.0  0.03s  0.085  0'164
30Table  2
Regression  Results  for money
multiplier and inflation rate, 1959-94
mnl  :  cr,o  + (t! mrr\-r + ct, rt
(1)  mlrq :  1.486  +  0.499  mkq.' - 0.019r'
(0.248)  (0.085)  (0.003)
(2)  mlrq :  0.821  +  0.916mlrq-'  *  0.010r'
(0.31s) (0.03s)  (0.01e)
JTy  n:1.0  n=1.10
Table 3
Date-  100 Total Capital Stocks
at 10% and 0% Inflation Rates  under
various  Reserve  Requirement  Ratios
2.21 0.036  2.55
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